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1 
EXTENDING THE AUTHORITY OF NO DISPARAGEMENT 
CLAUSES TO VOLUNTEERS: ADD IT TO A LONG LIST OF 
2016 ELECTION SURPRISES 
The 2016 United States Presidential election brought a new surprise 
at every corner and for several, has never ceased to amaze. One such 
example is the tens of thousands of individuals who have now, through a 
nondisclosure agreement required for all volunteers with The Trump 
campaign, agreed to never criticize Donald Trump or the Trump family 
for the rest of their lives. Throughout the campaign, pundits and lay per-
sons the like flocked to any kind of media or social media to express 
their “outrage” over the words said, or the actions taken by Mr. Donald 
Trump. But this time, the outrage might be different.  
Yes, Mr. Trump’s 2,271-word nondisclosure agreement (Agree-
ment) caused the same uproar as several other campaign tactics, but this 
time there is a legal question: Is a nondisclosure agreement forced upon 
volunteers with a lifetime no disparagement commitment enforceable?  
Agreements, like this one, are not new to Donald Trump; he has 
been quite successful over the years enforcing such contracts with former 
employees and even against an ex-wife.1 Considering Mr. Trump’s per-
ceived transferability from business to politics, it should come as no sur-
prise that Mr. Trump believes a nondisclosure agreement could bind a 
volunteer in the same manner as an employee. However, even though the 
waters of volunteer nondisclosure agreements are unchartered, an appli-
cation of the basic rules of employment contracts will likely prevent en-
forceability of said agreement.  
I. AGREEMENT 
There are five articles defining the scope of the Agreement: (1) no 
disclosure of confidential information, (2) no disparagement, (3) no 
competitive services, (4) no competitive solicitation, and (5) no competi-
tive intellectual property claims.2 A brief overview of articles (1) and (3) 
are included below and articles (4) and (5) are essentially omitted from 
this discussion. Article (2) is covered in more depth and reads as follows: 
No Disparagement. During the term of your service and at all times 
thereafter you hereby promise and agree not to demean or disparage 
  
 1. Elizabeth Preza, Trump’s Insane Nondisclosure Agreement Forbids All Volunteers from 
Saying Anything Bad about Him, Ever: The Campaign is Desperate to Control the Conversation 
Around Donald Trump, ALTERNET (September 6, 2016), http://www.alternet.org/election-
2016/trump-nda-forbids-volunteers-dissing-candidate (last visited September 28, 2016). 
 2. Agreement, http://talk.donaldjtrump.com/User/NonDisclosureAgreement (last visited 
September 8, 2016). 
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publicly the Company, Mr. Trump, and Trump Company, and Family 
Member, or any Family Member Company or any asset any of the 
foregoing own, or product or service any of the foregoing offer, in 
each case by or in any Restricted Means and Contexts and to prevent 
your employees from doing so.3 
II. ENFORCEABILITY 
a. A typical employer-employee restrictive covenant with good business 
intention is presumed enforceable.  
Nondisclosure agreements, non-compete agreements, no dispar-
agement clauses, and other restrictive covenants have long been em-
ployed by employers and are presumed to be enforceable by courts.4 In 
recent years, businesses have expanded the use of nondisclosure agree-
ments to protect business reputation and product or service evaluation.5 
Seemingly, the realm of “silence contracts” could be infinite as any indi-
vidual could persuade another individual to sign such an agreement to 
remain quiet.6  
To limit the endless possibilities of contracts available, courts have 
held that contract principles dictate that such promises only become en-
forceable contracts when there is consideration from the party accepting 
the vow of silence.7 As understood in contract law, in an absence of for-
mal consideration, courts may still enforce a contract that is a promise-
for-a-promise.8 However, a court may find a contract unenforceable if it 
is deemed unconscionable.9 The defense of unconscionability is seeming-
ly one of the strongest arguments against enforcement of Mr. Trump’s 
nondisclosure agreement. An imbalance of power, lack of complete mu-
tual consent, and contracts between companies and low level employees 
generally give rise to a higher likelihood of finding the contract uncon-
scionable.10 
A court’s presumption on an employee restrictive covenant is that 
the agreement is enforceable.11 Consequently, a Trump volunteer who is 
sued for violation of the agreement, will have the burden of proving the 
nondisclosure agreement is unenforceable. Pursuing an unconscionability 
defense is still likely the best argument. Knowing that courts treat em-
  
 3. Id. 
 4. Lucille M. Ponte, Protecting Brand Image or Gaming the System? Consumer "Gag" 
Contracts in an Age of Crowdsourced Ratings and Reviews, 7 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 59, 72 
(2016). 
 5. Id. at 75.  
 6. Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 Cornell 
L. Rev. 261, 268 (1998). 
 7. Id.; see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 71-94 (1981). 
 8. Garfield, supra note 3, at 279. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 285–86. 
 11. See Id. at 282. 
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ployees with low power and a great distance from their employer more 
favorably, a challenging volunteer will present evidence to show the 
power disparity. The question courts have not answered, and would like-
ly be the crux of this lawsuit, is: What is the power balance between a 
politician and a volunteer?  
b. To contest a restrictive covenant, the employee must prove the cove-
nant is unreasonable.  
The Agreement provides for each volunteer to personally subject 
themselves to jurisdiction in New York.  Thus, legal analysis of these 
covenants will be specific to New York. New York relies on a reasona-
bleness test in determining employee--employer restrictive covenants.12 
This reasonableness test balances the interests of the employer against 
the burden on the employee and the interests of the public.13 To deter-
mine reasonableness, New York has adopted the common law test for 
enforceability of restrictive covenants.14 Specifically, a covenant will be 
enforced if it: “(1) is no greater than is required for the protection of the 
legitimate interest of the employer, (2) does not impose undue hardship 
on the employee, and (3) is not injurious to the public.”15 In weighing 
these factors, courts must “focus on the particular facts and circumstanc-
es giving context to the agreement.”16 One example of factors courts look 
into is if the employer and employee are both members of a learned pro-
fession.17 In that instance, a court should look more favorably on restric-
tive covenants, especially contrasting a situation where a large power 
imbalance exists between the two parties signing the covenant.18 
III. OUTCOME 
New York courts have not specifically ruled on the enforcement of 
restrictive covenants between a politician and a volunteer, so the out-
come of contesting Mr. Trump’s agreement is uncertain. However, there 
are enough similar elements of the Agreement to various employment 
contracts that a legal prediction based on enforcement or non-
enforcement is reasonable. 
It is likely that a court would partially enforce the Agreement. The 
New York Court of Appeals in BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg,19 representa-
tive of New York law and procedure, held that an agreement with an 
overbroad provision was enforceable, with the exception of the specific 
  
 12. BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1224 (N.Y. 1999). 
 13. Id. at 1223. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Ashland Mgmt. Inc. v. Altair Investments NA, LLC, 869 N.Y.S.2d 465, 472 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2008), aff'd as modified, 925 N.E.2d 581 (N.Y. 2010). 
 16. BDO Seidman, 712 N.E.2d at 1224. 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. 
 19. 712 N.E.2d 1224 (N.Y. 1999). 
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overbroad provision.20 The BDO Seidman court specified that restrictive 
covenants should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, looking at the 
legitimacy of the whole document, as well as specific provisions.21 
Not all provisions in Mr. Trump’s volunteer agreement are unrea-
sonable. For example, the non-compete provision is limited in scope and 
duration, which probably makes it enforceable.22 Additionally, the confi-
dential campaign information, in conjunction with the non-compete pro-
vision look like legitimate business interests. Similar to a business that, 
for the interest of maintaining success and typically a client base, re-
quires employees to sign a geographical non-compete for a certain period 
of time. To compare a business to a campaign, Mr. Trump has a legiti-
mate interest in keeping confidential campaign interests protected in the 
immediate future. Certain confidential information, if presented to an 
opponent or the public, could have significantly damaging effects on his 
campaign.  
However, the no disparagement clause in Mr. Trump’s volunteer 
agreement is overbroad in breadth and duration. To begin with duration, 
this clause will likely fail on the first prong of the reasonableness test. 
Prohibiting volunteers from disparaging Mr. Trump after the election is 
over does not seem to fit into a legitimate business interest. For instance, 
business interests are usually connected to protecting a client base or the 
good will of a company.23 Here, the likely business interests for Mr. 
Trump would be to protect his interests in running for President of the 
United States. Certainly reputation plays a factor in a candidate’s likeli-
hood of being elected; perhaps requiring volunteers to refrain from dis-
paraging during the campaign would protect his reputation and conse-
quently his “business interest” of being elected. However, when a cam-
paign is over, win or lose, the business interests of being elected are, for 
all extents and purposes, gone. Thus, prohibiting disparagement beyond 
the interest of being elected is likely to be deemed overly broad by the 
courts.  
In addition to overbroad duration, the Agreement is overbroad in its 
scope of coverage. The Agreement seeks to prohibit disparagement of 
not only Mr. Trump, but also any Trump Company or family member. 
Additionally, the no disparagement clause extends beyond the volunteer 
to include the volunteer’s employees. Each of these extensions of re-
striction is likely to fail the second prong of the reasonableness test by 
placing an undue burden on the volunteer. The broad inclusion of any 
Trump Company or family member places a burden on the volunteer to 
be aware of, and know, each of Trump’s companies and family members 
  
 20. Id. at 1226.  
 21. Id.  
 22. See Ponte, supra note 4, at 72.  
 23. BDO Seidman, at 1224. 
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in order to comply. Even while avoiding the issue of duty or ability to 
control one’s employees, the expansiveness and inclusiveness of the no 
disparagement clause is likely to be deemed overbroad and unenforcea-
ble by going beyond the business interests and relationship between Mr. 
Trump and his volunteers.24  
If this covenant were to be challenged in New York courts, it would 
likely be upheld in part and reversed in part. BDO Seidman reinforced 
the ability of the courts to partially enforce restrictive covenants, on the 
relevancy of an employer’s business interest.25 The non-compete clause 
seems to be limited in scope and duration and connected close enough to 
business interests to be enforceable, but the no disparagement clause 
seems to be overbroad in several respects, which would likely be ruled 
unenforceable by a court. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that the 2016 United States Presidential Election 
will be historical on several accounts. The question posed here, however, 
is whether Mr. Trump’s volunteer agreement will set a new precedent of 
enforceable nondisclosure agreements between politicians and volun-
teers. After exploring New York’s laws regarding enforceability of em-
ployment contracts, though Mr. Trump may find these agreements bene-
ficial a court is not likely to enforce them. One can only hope a court 
strikes its enforceability before an expanded “silent contract” precedent 




 24. The issue of liability of employee’s behavior as well as your own is too complex and 
outside of the basic scope of this article. There are obvious legal concerns with such provision, such 
as employer/employee coercion, but the argument against enforceability of such provision is inten-
tionally omitted from this piece. 
 25. BDO Seidman, at 1226. 
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